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BOOK REVIEWS
The Dissenting Opinions of Mr. Justice Holmes. Arranged, with
introductory notes, by Alfred Lief, with a foreword by Dr.
George W. Kirchwey. New York: The Vanguard Press, 1929.
Pp. xx, 314.
The Social and Economic Views of Mr. Justice Brandeis. Collected,
with introductory notes, by Alfred Lief, with a foreword by
Charles A. Beard. New York: The Vanguard Press. Pp. xxiv,
419.
Mr. Justice Holmes. Contributions by Benjamin N. Cardozo [etc.].
Edited by Felix Frankfurter. New York: Coward-McCann,
Inc., 1931. Pp. xii, 241.
Mr. Justice Brandeis. Essays by Charles E. Hughes'[etc.]. Edited
by Felix Frankfurter, with an introduction by Oliver Wendell
Holmes. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1932. Pp. x, 232.
In 1881 there appeared a volume called "The Common Law."
Its author was a Boston lawyer just turned forty. He had served
gallantly in the Civil War. He had edited an edition of Kent's Commentaries. He was the editor of a law review and had been a lecturer at the Harvard Law School. But he was then perhaps best
known as the son of the genial physician, essayist and poet whose
paper on puerperal fever had justly fixed his reputation with the
medical faculty but whose "Autocrat" and humorous verse had
brought general fame. The father was doubtless one of the few
members of the Saturday Club who could poke fun at Brahmin
foibles. The son had certain of his father's qualities, a sceptical
turn of mind, professional devotion, and a sense of literary form
worthy of the originality of his ideas. In the next year, '82, came
that "stroke of lightning"-to use his own phrase-which changed
his whole career. He became a judge on the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court, later its Chief Justice, and after twenty years' service a Justice of the Supreme Court at Washington. After almost
fifty years on the bench-just a year ago-he retired, aged almost
91, but preserving to the last that independence of temper, acuteness
of intellect and philosophic breadth of view for which his name had
become a byword: par excellence, the Lawyer as Philosopher, one
might even say, the Lawyer as Hero.
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"The Common Law" was itself an extraordinary book, but even
more so when one remembers that it was written before Maitland's
first essay. Holmes had no historical precursor in America unless
we count Bigelow. Ames, Thayer and Gray all came later. In England, Maine had broken ground, but the work of Pollock, Maitland
and Vinogradoff was still in the future. The study of the history of
legal science was in its infancy. The return to the Year Books,
however, was not all.' Holmes showed a new critical spirit toward
the past: history was only a means to an end ;2 and logic was made
the handmaid of experience.8
The qualities we have noted in the scholar were soon manifest in
the judge (what a fascinating task for Holmes's future biographer
it will be to follow through the thousand cases of his Massachusetts
4
And later, as a
judicial tenure the development of his doctrines !).
Justice of the Supreme Court he, like Marshall, never forgot "that
it is a constitution we are expounding." 5 For the Supreme Bench
demands a skill in statecraft often beyond the technical lawyer. No
judge has seen more clearly than Holmes that progress means change,
experimentation, perhaps repeated failure: "There is nothing that I
more deprecate than the use of the Fourteenth Amendment beyond
the absolute compulsion of its words to prevent the making of social
experiments that an important part of the community desires, in the
insulated' chambers afforded by the several states, even though the
experiments may seem futile or even noxious to me and to those
whose judgment I most respect."0 His scientific detachment has led
him to withhold condemnation of experiments with which he disagreed both as to means and object: "Otherwise a constitution ...
would become the partisan of a particular set of ethical or economical
opinions, which by no means are held semper ubique et ab omnibus."7
1"1 ... having done my share of quotation from the Year Books." Address at Langdell Dinner (1895), Coi,. LmAI. PAPERS (1920) 138.
2 ,. . . Continuity with the past is only a necessity and not a duty." CoLL.
LEGAL PAPERS (1920) 211; and again: "It is revolting to have no better reason
for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV."

Id. at 187.
experience."
8 "The life of the law has not been logic; it has been

THE

LAw (1881) p. 1.
' See Frankfurter's classified list of Holmes's Massachusetts opinions in
(1931) 44 HAxv. L. RIv. 799.

CommoN

McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 407 (1819).

'Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 344 (1921)

(dissent).

Cf. "The Four-

teenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics."
Lochner v. N. Y., 198 U. S. 45, 76 (1905).
7 Otis v. Parker, 187 U. S.606, 608-609 (1903).
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But where he has found the challenged- power, or the constitutional
guarantee, clear, and his own moral conviction supports his judicial
conclusion, he has always spoken with fervor. 8 His innate scepticism, his belief that "the best test of truth is the power of the thought
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market,"9 his readiness
to give the other fellow's opinion-especially if it be that of a legislature-the benefit of the doubt, have earned for him the name of
"liberal." John Dewey believes that this combination of belief in the
conclusions of intelligence, freedom of thought, and room for social
experiment justifies the epithet.10 But this is very far from saying
that Holmes is the advocate of a new order, either social or economic."1 His liberalism is an attitude of mind and is much nearer
akin to the sceptical detachment of a grand seigneur of the Eighteenth Century than most suppose.
We have in Mr. Justice Brandeis, with whose name Holmes's is
so often linked, a different type of man and of "liberal." Born in
Kentucky in 1856, a Jew, whose parents left Bohemia after the
Vienna rebellion of '48 ;12 also a product of the Cambridge legal
tradition and a Boston lawyer, but until the age of 60 engaged in the
hurly-burly of social controversy; stigmatized by all the vile and
violent things which an outraged plutocracy could find for this Tribune of the Plebs when appointed by President Wilson to the Supreme Court some sixteen years ago ;13 Louis D. Brandeis comes
very near to realizing the ideal lawyer of the future as foreseen by
Holmes, a "man of statistics and the master of economics.' 4 That
mastery which now stamps his opinions, especially in the untrammelled expression of dissent, when every statement is fully documented, comes from those years before 1916, when he fought in
courtroom, legislative lobby and on the platform, without fee or
IAs in his dissents upon the child labor law, Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247
U. S. 251, 277 (1918) ; upon freedom of speech, Abrams v. U. S., 250 U. S.
616, 627 (1919) ; upon Government wire-tapping, Olmstead v. U. S., 277 U. S.
438, 469 (1927); or upon naturalization tests, U. S. v. Schwimmer, 279 U. S.
644, 653 (1928).
'Abrams v. U. S. (dissent), supra note 8.
.T1ustice Holmes and the Liberal Mind, THE Nw REPUBLiC, 11 January
1928, reprinted in Professor Frankfurter's book at p. 33.
uSee, for instance, Economic Elements (1904) in CoLr. LEGAL PAPERS

(1920) 279.
"Josephine Goldmark, THE PILGRIMS oF '48 (New York, 1931).
" Professor Beard points out in his introduction to Mr. Lief's book that
among American Bar Association ex-presidents, Taft, Root and Choate all
vigorously opposed the nomination. P. ix.
I The Path of the Law, COLL. LEGAL PAPERS (1920) 187.
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other reward, for Boston's control of its street railways, for cheaper
gas in Boston, against the New Haven's New England railroad
monopoly, for cheaper industrial insurance, for shorter hours for
women workers, in arbitration of the cloakmakers' strike, in exposure
of bureaucracy in the Ballinger conservation controversy against the
money trust, and as adviser to the Interstate Commerce Commission
on railroad management. 15
His liberalism has the same foundation as Holmes's in a profound
belief in the necessity for liberty. "Those who won our independence," he has said, "believed that the final end of the State was to
make men free to develop their faculties, and that in its government
the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a means. They believed liberty to
be the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty.
They believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you
think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political
truth; . . . and that this should be a fundamental principle of the
American Government."1 6 And he believes in democracy. But there
are profound differences between the two "liberal" judges. Brandeis
distrusts certain economic trends. He distrusts big business not only
as a political oppressor of the "little fellow" but because of its inefficiency. He looks to social legislation to remedy social ills. He
finds the best safeguard of "natural" liberty in economic freedom,
for he realizes keenly that employers may indirectly usurp the former, as to the vast army of the employed, by directly stifling the
latter. He has a creed, in other words, which he seeks to justify by
faith and works, rather than a sublime tolerance of the mistakes of
mankind in its striving, by trial and error, toward a higher goal.
But he finds with Holmes a common ground in the belief that progress implies experimentation. Take, for example, a recent and notable dissent in which after dwelling upon the "unbridled competition"
which is, rightly or wrongly, thought by many to have brought us to
our present pass in which "misery is wide-spread, in a time, not of
scarcity, but of over-abundance," he pleads for freedoin in social
legislative experimentation: ". . . we must ever be on our guard, lest
we erect our prejudices into legal principles. If we would guide by
" See his BusiNEss-A PRorrssboN (Boston, 1914), and with its foreword

by Ernest Poole; and his OTHER PEoPe's MoNEY AND How THE BANYMs
USE IT (New York, 1914) ; for fugitive essays and addresses on these matters
there collected. A few excerpts are reprinted in Mr. Lief's book.
I' Concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 373 (1927).
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the light of reason, we must let our minds be bold."'17 Nor does he
think that the "process of trial by error, so fruitful in the physical
sciences," should stop here, for he would apply it, as his dissent in a
more recent case indicates, even to the judicial process of the court
itself, and not let stare decisis bar the way to a new position justified
by newly ascertained facts.'8
There is every reason, therefore, why we should welcome new
books on Holmes and Brandeis. Professor Frankfurter's volume on
Holmes is a symposium of reprinted pieces by many hands, including
among others Cardozo, Learned Hand, Laski, Morris Cohen, Lippman, and Wigmore. If it contained nothing else-and what else it
does contain is very good indeed- the book would justify itself by
bringing before a larger public Professor Frankfurter's long and
careful essay, "Mr. Justice Holmes and the Constitution."' 1 The
similar volume on Brandeis is made up of essays contributed to the
Harvard, Yale and Columbia Law Reviews in November 1931 on the
occasion of his reaching his seventy-fifth birthday. Chief Justice
Hughes contributes a short notice, Professor Frankfurter a long and
valuable essay on his constitutional decisions, while others consider
him in various aspects. Most significant is the brief foreword by
Justice Holmes. "Whenever he left my house," Holmes says of his
friend and former brother-justice, "I was likely to say to my wife,
'There goes a really good man.' I think that the world now would
agree with me in adding what the years have proved 'and a great
judge'."
In Mr. Lief's volume on Mr. justice Holmes are included a brief
essay on "Natural Law," 20 fifty-five dissenting opinions, and eighty
pages of excerpts from majority opinions. Why dissenting opinions?
Because, undoubtedly, Holmes has for years led a minority of the'
court which has refused, to cite a single instance of constitutional
interpretation upon which reasonable men may differ and differ
widely, to find "in the vague contours of the Fourteenth Amendment" much that his colleagues saw there. And then, too, dissenting
opinions have more individual flavor. Mr. Lief's volume on Mr.
Justice Brandeis includes 80 pages of "Ideas expressed before
1918"; while the rest embraces 30 of his opinions; but the whole
'New

State Ice Co. v. Liebmann (dissent), 285 U. S. 262, 311 (1932).

v. Coronado Oil and Gas Co. (dissent), 285 U. S. 393, 405 (1932).
"Reprinted from (1927) 41 HARv. L. REv. 121.
Reprinted from (1918) 32 HARv. L. REv. 40.
S Burnet
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hardly justifies the sonority of the title, "Social and Economic Views
of Mr. Justice Brandeis." -In both volumes a short, non-technical
and quite helpful statement of the background is prefixed to each
case, and the cases are classified under general headings, with special
captions for each case. It may be regretted that the last sometimes
savor of the tabloid newspaper, as "What price water?", "Gas Across
the Borders," "Tried by White Men," "Near-War of the States."
These two books should do much, however, to bring two of our
greatest judges home to the layman, and will, of course, be welcome
to the lawyer who will find in their compact and readable form
many old friends of the official reports. The lawyer will regret, however, that citations of court decisions have been omitted in the opinions as "only of technical interest": one can as well forget, in regarding a stream, the banks which give it course or the occasional boulder
which causes a new avulsion.
Of the two judges, Brandeis, it must be admitted, suffers most
from such a selective process. If Holmes's opinions read more
easily and his brilliant epigrams stick in the memory longer than the
words of Brandeis, it is because Holmes employs a more philosophical approach and generalizes, but with great conciseness, from the
particular facts, while Brandeis is inclined to pile up cumulatively
his arguments on top of a great array of facts amassed in support
of his conclusion. Holmes has, moreover, a marvellous sense of
literary form. But if we read today the scintillating maxims of La
Rochefoucauld and not the judgments of D'Aguesseau, no moral
reflection is thereby implied: one form is simply better calculated to
survive as literature.
MANGUM WEEKS.

Washington, D. C.
Taxation in North Carolina. Sponsored by The North Carolina Club
at the University and The North Carolina Conference for Social
Service. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press,
1932. Pp. 80. $.50.
It is a highly commendable service to North Carolina which the
sponsors and authors of this bulletin have performed. Compressed
into eighty pages are fifteen very compact articles on tax problems
of immediate concern to the state. Twelve economists and public
officials, Clarence Heer, John P. Stedman, S. H. Hobbs, Jr., A. S.
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Keister, Fred Morrison, D. G. Brummitt, A. D. McLean, R. B.
Tower, W. G. Query, Frank Coxe, Sennett Conner, and A. W. McAlister, discuss the cost of government in the state, the present
sources of revenue, and the possibilities of new sources.
To state the contents in the merest of outlines, the bulletin says:
North Carolina, as most other states, is confronted with real difficulties in public finance. A heavy load of public debt has been
incurred, but it represents value received. The state ranks rather
low in per capita wealth and income and necessarily must pay a
larger rate if it would have the services more wealthy states provide.
There are no superfluous governmental services the abandonment of
which would cut the tax bill greatly. A large part of our revenue
goes for debt payments which will be with us a long time. Education accounts for three-fifths of the reducible costs; so a decrease in
taxes must be largely at the expense of that service. Compared with
other states North Carolina taxes are not excessive. They may,
however, be inequitably distributed. Property pays about fifty per
cent of the taxes in this state, and this is next to the lowest percentage in the United States. Farm property, although it contributes only
about one-fifth of the property taxes, is exceedingly hard pressed
because farm incomes have declined so greatly. The North Carolina
inheritance and income tax rates are among the highest. Interstate
competition both in these and in franchise taxes are restraints on
much further extension. A general sales tax or a tax on selected
commodities offers a field for additional revenue. The final chapter
is entitled "A Tax Program for North Carolina." It enunciates a
long term program and a fearless present-day tax policy for the state,
that North Carolina may not lose what has been gained, and to this
end that the principle of ability to pay be applied to the surplus wealth
in the state, giving this wealth an opportunity to justify its existence.
This last is not a very specific policy and obviously there are grave
obstacles in the way.
There is considerable misinformation about taxes in North Carolina and a reliable, up-to-date discussion of so vital a problem is
most welcome. For the most part the authors have limited them-

selves to factual information with a minimum of opinion. Several
articles are so packed with facts and figures that one desires more
interpretation, and especially when the opinions in these particular
articles, though rare, are very convincing.
E. M. PERKINS.
Chapel Hill, N. C.

